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MARSHA GARRISONt
"[T]he movement of the progressive societies," Sir Henry Maine's
famous maxim decreed, "has hitherto been a movement from Status to
Contract."' In a recent book entitled The Marriage Contract,2 Profes-
sor Lenore Weitzman argues that our society's law of marriage and
divorce has not followed Maine's maxim-and that it now should.
Professor Weitzman was trained as a sociologist and did postgrad-
uate work at Yale Law School. As principal investigator for the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley's Divorce Law Research Project,' she
has for several years directed an ongoing empirical study into the effect
of California's changing divorce laws in shaping custody awards and
post-divorce financial arrangements. She has also written extensively
on divorce and the family,5 and is now nationally recognized as an ex-
-Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A. 1970, University of Utah; J.D.
1975, Harvard University.
1 H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 170 (1st ed. London 1861).
2 L. WErrMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT (1981).
8 The Divorce Law Research Project is directed under the auspices of the University's
Center for the Study of Law and Society.
4 For reports of this research, see Dixon & Weitzman, When Husbands File for Divorce, 44
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 103 (1982); Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic
Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce]; Dixon & Weitzman, Evaluating the
Impact of No-Fault Divorce in California, 29 FAM. REL 297 (1980); Weitzman & Dixon, The
Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Difference?, 14 FAM. L.Q. 141 (1980); Weitz-
man & Dixon, The Transformation of Marriage Through No-Fault Divorce: The Case of the
United States in MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES 143 (J. Eekelaar
& S. Katz eds. 1980); and Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and
Empirial Patterns for Child Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REV.
473 (1979).
5 Weitzman, Changing Families, Changing Laws: the Revolution in Family Law, 5 FAM.
ADVOC. 2 (1982); Weitzman, Contracts for Intimate Relationships: A Study of Contracts Before,
Within, and In Lieu of Legal Marriage, 1 ALTERNATE LIFESTYLES 303 (1978); Weitzman, Di-
vorce and Marital Partnership: The Problem of Legal Recognition of the Wife's Contribution in
GOVERNMENT IMPACT ON FAMILY LIFE (B.A. Chadwick ed. 1977); Weitzman, To Love, Honor,
and Obey? Traditional Legal Marriage and Alternative Family Forms, 24 FAM. COORDINATOR
531 (1975); Weitzman, The Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change-A Proposal
for Individual Contracts and Contracts in Lieu of Marriage, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (1974)
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pert on the consequences of divorce in modern American society.
In The Marriage Contract Weitzman does not present new empir-
ical data on marriage or divorce; instead she argues that, as a matter of
public policy, the "state-dictated marriage contract ' 0 imposed by law
when individuals assume the status of husband and wife should be re-
placed by individually negotiated contracts within and in lieu of tradi-
tional marriage. The contracts for which Weitzman seeks recognition,
it is important to note, are not standard antenuptial contracts concern-
ing post-marriage inheritance and property rights; rather, they are ex-
tremely detailed agreements concerning the couple's daily life together.'
Weitzman is not the first to argue for legal recognition of such "inti-
mate contracts"; 8 the idea was initially popularized by feminist writers
at least ten years ago and has received continuing, if sporadic, treat-
ment in both the legal literature and the popular press.9 Weitzman has
been an influential contract advocate for some time, however, and The
Marriage Contract itself grew out of a widely cited 1974 law review
article in which she first argued for legal recognition of contracts be-
tween cohabiting couples. 0 In the years since that article appeared,
Weitzman has obviously rethought and refined her arguments, and has
expanded them to take account of recent legal developments that per-
tain to the contract thesis. Perhaps as a result of this lengthy incubation
period, The Marriage Contract provides the most thorough and care-
[hereinafter cited as Weitzman, Marriage Regulation]; and L. Weitzman, Assumptions About the
Nature of Women in Family Law (available from Yale Law School, 1971).
6 L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at xvii.
I See infra notes 13, 75-76 and accompanying text. For a list of possible contract topics and
representative examples of intimate contracts, see L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 255-333.
8 The term "intimate contract" is Weitzman's. See L. WErzMAN, supra note 2, at xxii.
Herein, I have used that term, "marriage contract," and "contractual marriage" interchangeably.
9 For examples of articles aimed at a general audience, see Edmiston, How to Write Your
Own Marriage Contract, MS., Spring, 1972, at 66; Sheresky & Mannes, A Radical Guide to
Wedlock, 55 SAT. REv., July 29, 1972, at 33; To Love, Honor and. . .Share: A Marriage
Contract for the Seventies, MS., June, 1973, at 62; What to Include When Drawing Up a Mar-
riage Contract, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 26, 1979, at 24, col. 1.
For examples of the legal literature, see Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, 50 U. COLO. L. REV.
204 (1982); Fleischmann, Marriage by Contract: Defining the Terms of the Relationship, 8 FAM.
L.Q. 27 (1974); Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and
Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558 (1974); Neely, Marriage Contracts, for Better
or for Worse, JURIS DR., Sept. 1977, at 38; Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New
Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204 (1982); Weitzman, Marriage Regulation, supra
note 5; Comment, Marriage as Contract: Toward a Functional Redefinition of the Marital Status,
9 COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 606 (1973); Note, Marital Contracts Which May Be Put Asunder,
13 J. FAM. L. 23 (1973-74); Note, Marriage Contracts for Support and Services: Constitutionality
Begins at Home, 49 N.Y.U. L. RE v. 1161 (1974).
'0 Weitzman, Marriage Regulation, supra note 5. Portions of this article are excerpted in
several widely used family law casebooks. See, e.g., J. AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY
LAW 119-28 (1978); C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW
730-45 (2d ed. 1976); W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DO-
MESTIC RELATIONS 70-75 (3d ed. 1978).
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fully reasoned defense of contractual marriage that has yet appeared.
In advocating contractual marriage, Weitzman's focus is on the
personal advantages of an intimate contract to the individuals who ne-
gotiate such an agreement.11 Only peripherally does she consider the
viability of contractual marriage as a legal innovation.
The contract model that Weitzman proposes, however, would fun-
damentally change the legal regulation of marriage. Were her proposal
to be adopted, marriage as a status would cease to have legal signifi-
cance. A couple, married or unmarried, could negotiate the terms and
duration of their relationship. Additionally, the law of marriage and
divorce would be at least partly subsumed by the law of contracts; fam-
ily and divorce courts would focus on interpreting and enforcing private
agreements, rather than on deciding cases in accordance with substan-
tive family law principles. Under Weitzman's proposal, the courts
would also become involved in a wider variety of family disputes. Al-
though the judiciary has traditionally avoided spousal disputes unless
the couple is separated and the disagreement concerns maintenance,
property or child custody,1" the intimate contracts which Weitzman ad-
vocates would be enforceable throughout the relationship and would
cover virtually every facet of married life.1
11 Weitzman indicates that an intimate contract offers a couple several social and psychologi-
cal advantages:
Contracts facilitate open and honest communication, and help prospective partners
to clarify their expectations. Once this is done, the contract creates a normative
guide for future behavior. In addition, a contract can help a couple to identify and
resolve potential conflicts in advance, and can provide a useful system for dealing
with other conflicts that arise in an ongoing marriage. Finally, contracts increase
predictability and security.
L. WErTZMAN, supra note 2, at 228. Weitzmian also suggests that a contract offers a couple several
legal advantages. Id. at 227. Each of these supposed legal advantages is dependent, however, on
the contract's enforceability.
Is See, e.g., Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 268 Ala. 475, 107 So. 2d 885 (1958). In Kilgrow, a father
sought to have his wife (the mother of his child) enjoined from interfering with his placing his
daughter in a religious school. The Alabama Supreme Court held that although "if this were a
proceeding to determine the child's custody the equity court would have jurisdiction," here it did
not since the parents continued to live together. Id. at 478, 107 So. 2d at 888. "It would be
anomalous to hold that a court of equity may sit in constant supervision over a household .. .
Id. at 479, 107 So. 2d at 889.
The court also held that an antenuptial agreement between the parents that provided for the
child to be "baptized and educated" in the "religion" of the father, id. at 478, 107 So. 2d at 888
(quoting the agreement), had "no bearing on the question of the trial court's jurisdiction . .. ." Id.
at 480, 107 So. 2d at 889.
See also McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953) (in order to maintain
an action for spousal support, husband and wife must be separated).
Is See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 284-85. Examples of provisions in Weitzman's sample
contracts include:
Nancy promises to give a dinner party or to otherwise aid David's professional
advancement by entertaining at least twice a week.
David agrees to accompany Nancy to the ballet at least once a month.
David also agrees to schedule at least two two-week vacations with her each year, at
1983]
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. The Marriage Contract thus raises far-reaching questions about
the role that the state, through the legal system, ought to play in regu-
lating intimate relationships. Although Weitzman does not focus on
these questions,14 she does present an argument that governmental in-
terests support the legal recognition and enforcement of intimate con-
tracts.15 The fate of the intimate contract as a legal innovation ulti-
mately depends, of course, on the persuasiveness of her argument: if the
state has no legitimate interests that support recognition and enforce-
ment of marriage contracts, we would not expect-or consider it appro-
priate-for the legal system to adopt this approach to the regulation of
intimate relationships. Because of its importance, Weitzman's argument-
for the legal recognition and enforcement of marriage contracts will be
the focus of the essay.
I. THE CASE FOR CONTRACT
Weitzman's case for contract rests on two foundations. She claims
that the traditional marriage contract imposed by law no longer meets
the needs or reflects the personal values of most modern American
couples, and that the alternative of contractual marriage will enable
least one of them in Europe.
Id. at 298.
All necessary tasks will be divided into two categories. On even-numbered months
... Susan will be responsible for category 1 and Peter for category 2; and vice
versa ....
Each party will do her or his own cooking and cleanup afterwards for breakfast
and lunch, as well as keeping her or his own study clean.
In the event that one party neglects to perform any task, the other party may per-
form it and charge the nonperforming partner $25 per hour ....
Id. at 304.
Responsibility for birth control will be shared equally. Susan will have this respon-
sibility for the first six months of the year, Peter for the second six months.
Id.
We . . . commit ourselves to putting time and creative energy into realizing our
sexual potential.
We will tell each other when we have sex with other people,.
Id. at 320 (contract in lieu of marriage).
Linda will be entitled to two days off each week [from full-time employment as a
homemaker].
Id. at 329 (contract in lieu of marriage).
14 The Marriage Contract is apparently aimed at an audience of couples who might be con-
sidering a contract. (It is subtitled A Guide to Living With Lovers and Spouses.) With this audi-
ence in mind, Weitzman's presentation of her policy argument in favor of contract is given second
billing. The argument is not tightly organized and, more importantly, does not take account of
other alternatives. For a discussion of these alternatives, see infra notes 30-35, 52-57 and accom-
panying text.
15 L. WErrZMAN, supra note 2, at 246-54.
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couples "to order their personal relationships as they wish and to devise
a structure appropriate for their individual needs and values,""" thus
promoting state interests in family stability as .well as the security and
happiness of the contracting parties.
A. What's Wrong with Traditional Marriage?
The traditional marriage contract imposed by law, Weitzman as-
serts, consists of four propositions:17 1) the husband is head of the
household; 2) the husband is responsible for support; 3) the wife is
responsible for domestic services; and 4) the wife is responsible for child
care while the husband is responsible for child support.
While these propositions accurately describe the traditional family,
Weitzman easily establishes that, for an increasingly large segment of
American couples, they are inaccurate.18 The new American marriage
is considerably more egalitarian than the traditional model and its divi-
sion of labor is less likely to be defined by sex.19 The new American
marriage is also punctuated by divorce and remarriage. 0 Additionally,
there are now many couples, both heterosexual and homosexual, who
live in marriage-type relationships without benefit of a formal marriage
ceremony.21 Legal assumptions about marriage and the family, asserts
Weitzman, simply have not kept up with rapid changes in behavior,
with the result that the traditional marriage contract is now at odds
with social reality.
The traditional marriage contract is also objectionable, Weitzman
16 Id. at xxi.
27 Id. at 2. For a detailed discussion of each provision, see id. at 5-134.
18 See id. 135-223.
19 See id. at 168-89. In 1979, 51% of American women of working age were in the paid
work force, S. LEVITAN & R. BELOUS, WHAT'S HAPPENING TO THE AMFRICAN FAMILY 88 (1981),
as opposed to less than 5% in 1890. L. WErIZMAN, supra note 2, at 169. The greatest increase in
women's labor force participation during the 1970's was that of married women. Id. The move-
ment of women out of the home has apparently influenced both male and female perceptions of
appropriate sex roles. In a CBS-New York Times poll cited by Weitzman, for example; respon-
dents were asked which of two types of marriage they believed to be more satisfying- a marriage in
which the husband is exclusively the provider and the wife exclusively a homemaker and mother
or one in which partners share the task of breadwinner and homemaker. Although 43% of the
general population preferred the traditional roles, only 27% of respondents aged 18 to 29 preferred
traditional marriage. Id. at 175-76.
20 See S. LEVITAN & R. BELOUS, supra note 19, at 139-67.
In 1979 there was one divorce for every two marriages. Projections indicate that
about 38% of first marriages by women between the ages of 25 to 29 will end in
divorce; but three out of every four will remarry, and 45% of those who remarry
will go through divorce again.
Id. at 12.
21 See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 204-24. "In 1960 an estimated 439,000 households
were made up of unmarried couples. By the end of the 1970s the number of unmarried couples
had increased by 150% to over 1 million." S. LEVITAN & R. BELOUS, supra note 19, at 35.
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asserts, because it perpetuates the subjugation of women.22 It promotes,
she claims, their identification as dependents, and encourages a false
sense of security based on the husband's obligation of support.2 ' Con-
comitantly, it encourages women to forego their own education and
training in order to further their husbands' careers. 4 The traditional
contract, Weitzman urges, also promotes impermissible gender discrim-
ination by assigning rights and privileges on the basis of sexual stereo-
types, without regard to their accuracy.25
Weitzman's final objection to traditional marriage is that it denies
the diversity that marks current family forms:
The traditional model assumes that all people marry when
they are young and that they stay married to the same per-
son for the rest of their lives. Not only does this model ignore
the social reality of marriage, divorce, cohabitation, and re-
marriage throughout the life cycle, but it is based on the as-
sumption that the state can decide what form marriage
should have regardless of its citizens' needs and desires.26
The lives and values of modern couples are, Weitzman claims, simply
too various to be dealt with by a single set of behavioral and legal
norms.
2 7
B. A Strategy for Reform: Why Contract?
The fact that traditional marriage law is objectionable does not, of
course, mean that contractual marriage is the only, or the best, cure. In
order to assess the merits of the contract model we must know how it
compares with other possible reforms. Unfortunately, Weitzman leaps
from the defects of traditional marriage law to the merits of the con-
tract model without pause for any discussion of alternatives.2 8 In fact,
however, there are at least two other ways by which the deficiencies in
traditional family law might be addressed.
"' See L. WErrzMAN, supra note 2, at xx-xxi.
2 See id. at 40-49, 53-59.
2 See id. at 57-59.
' See id. at xx. "
See id. at xxi.
Weitzman also suggests that a single legal norm for all marriages conflicts with American
society's tradition of promoting individual values and autonomy. Id. at 137.
" Weitzman's failure to consider alternatives may be due to the fact that The Marriage
Contract is primarily aimed at couples who are planning how to order their own relationship. See
supra note 14. These couples could draft a (perhaps unenforceable) contract in an attempt to "opt
out" of the state-imposed contract which Weitzman describes, but could not individually initiate
any other type of law reform.
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1. Updating Outmoded Marriage Law Rules
a. What a Revised Marriage Law Could Accomplish
The most obvious method of reforming traditional marriage law is
to simply revise those rules which are outmoded in order to bring them
into conformity with modern social conditions and values.
This process is, in fact, already well under way. Like the Ameri-
can family, family law is currently in a state of flux. The traditional
rules which Weitzman describes are no longer uniformly applied, and
courts and legislatures have adopted a wide variety of new standards in
an attempt to "keep up with" the changing family. Legal change has
not, of course, kept abreast of social change, but in the last ten years its
pace has been rapid and many of the most objectionable features of the
traditional marriage contract which Weitzman describes are already
pass6. 9
It is not apparent that contract recognition is a better means of
curing the objectionable features of traditional marriage law than this
ongoing process of rule revision. On the one hand, contract recognition
could not, by itself, cure the deficiencies of traditional marriage law.
For example, Weitzman cites five legal rules that buttress the stereo-
type that the husband is head of the family: different age of marriage
requirements for the two sexes, a married woman's automatic assump-
tion of her husband's name, a legitimate child's automatic assumption
of its father's name, a wife's automatic assumption of her husband's
domicile, and differing rights to sue for loss of consortium.30 None of
those rules could be effectively changed through marriage contracts.
21 With respect to the husband's duty of support, for example, post-divorce spousal support
laws running in favor of wives only were declared invalid in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), and
the trend is toward equitable division of the marital assets-an approach which emphasizes the
partnership aspects of marriage-rather than on alimony, which is awarded to the wife as a de-
pendent. Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia now have provisions for equitable or
equal distribution of marital property. [Ref. File] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 400:iv-v (1982). Similarly,
the traditional presumption that a wife will obtain child custody is giving way rapidly. In thirty-
six states, both parents now have an equal right to custody. Weitzman's California research also
suggests that men are quite successful in obtaining custody; in a 1977 sample, 63% of the divorced
fathers who asked for custody obtained it; even in those cases in which custody was fully contested,
fathers were granted custody in one out of three cases. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 112. Joint
custody is also statutorily authorized in at least twenty-seven states, Freed & Foster, Family Law
in the Fifty States: An Overview as of September 1982, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 4065, 4090
(1982), and in at least eight states there is a statutory presumption in favor of joint custody. [Ref.
File] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 400: iv-v (1982). As to the husband's position as head of the house-
hold, one noted commentator has described it as a rule "tacitly ... relegated to the museum of
legal antiquities." Rheinstein, The Transformation of Marriage and the Law, 68 NW. U.L. REV.
463, 466 (1973). See generally Weyrauch, Metamorphosis of Marriage, 13 FAM. L.Q. 415 (1979)
(describing "[e]xtraordinary changes in American family law within the past decade [that] have
affected every institution").
30 See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 5-22.
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Contracts could not play any role in altering age requirements or the
right to sue for loss of consortium as those rules, to be meaningful,
must have uniform application. With respect to the others, contracts
could provide no more than a partial, fairly cumbersome solution: un-
less all couples were required to draft agreements on these subjects, a
residual legal standard or presumption would still be needed for those
without a contract.$' On the other hand, any stereotyping inherent in
those rules could be eliminated simply by changing them, without re-
course to marital contracts.
Such rule changes would, in general, better achieve improvement
in the status of married women. 2 Aside from the fact that contract
recognition would affect only those women who convince their partners
to participate in drafting an agreement 3-a group that is likely to in-
dude disproportionate numbers of affluent, well-educated women
whose status is least in need of improvement-contract negotiation, in
itself, provides no incentive for an egalitarian relationship. Improve-
ment in the position of women is thus dependent, under the contract
model, on their individual negotiating skills and assertiveness. A re-
formed marriage law, on the other hand, could enunciate new egalita-
rian norms that would apply with equal force to all women.
Nor is it apparent that contract recognition is the best means to
accommodate diversity in marital arrangements. A reformed marriage
law could accomodate diversity quite simply by eliminating reliance on
sex based stereotypes and, instead, requiring courts to determine the
norms and expectations a couple actually held during their relationship
as a basis for determining the rights of each. This type of reform
would,, again, have the advantage of applying to all couples, not just
those who had drafted contracts.3 Additionally, for some nontraditional
81 For two of the rule topics-the determination of a married woman's name and domi-
cile-determination by contract would also seem to raise the same charges of gender discrimina-
tion that Weitzman levels against traditional marriage law: if married men may continue to indi-
vidually determine their names and domicile surely married women should be accorded the same
right of individual choice.
3' For a similar view, see Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspec-
tive, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1159-70 (1981).
33 The terms of most purported "contracts" between unmarried couples which have thus far
been litigated have described very traditional relationships. The alleged contract in the Marvin
case, for example, provided that the female partner would "render her services as a companion,
homemaker, housekeeper, and cook . . . [as well as] give up her lucrative career as a[n] enter-
tainer [and] singer .... " while the male partner would "provide for all of plaintiff's financial
support and needs for the rest of her life .... ." Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 664, 557 P.2d.
106, 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 819 (1976). See also cases cited infra note 34.
' Very few cohabitants, married or unmarried, draft formal agreements. A Swedish re-
searcher found, for example, that among 250 unmarried cohabitants, only one had a formal cohab-
itation contract. J. TROST, UNMARRIED COHABITATION 160 (1979), cited in Blumberg, supra note
32, at 1164. Similarly, American case law on contracts between unmarried couples reveals vague,
oral agreements rather than detailed, specific contract provisions. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18
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couples-those who would like to marry but are prohibited from so
doing under traditional marriage law-a change in the rules regarding
marriage eligibility would almost certainly be preferred to contract rec-
ognition. Weitzman's own research establishes that most couples still
define the marital relationship as a different and more committed bond
than that implied by nonmarital cohabitation, even if accompanied by a
contract.35
b. Why Weitzman Rejects a Rule Change Strategy
Weitzman does not explicitly reject rule change as a complement
to contract recognition and it is quite possible-particularly in view of
the fact that some individuals will undoubtedly choose not to write con-
trActs-that she would approve such a combined approach. Weitzman
does, however, implicitly reject rule change as a primary law reform
strategy. The basis for this position is, apparently, her concern that a
system of state-imposed rules will necessarily provide inadequate pro-
tection to rights of individual choice.3 6 "The very concept of a single
structure for all intimate relationships," Weitzman asserts, "is in its
nature tyrannical."37 The state interests that have been asserted to jus-
tify restrictions on private ordering are, she claims, simply not "impor-
tant enough to supersede individual rights to privacy and freedom."3"
In assessing the validity of this assertion, it is important to note
Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 II1. 2d 49, 394
N.E.2d 1204 (1979); Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 407 N.E.2d 438, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1980). A compendium of additional cases can be found in Freed & Foster, supra note 29, at
4099-104.
" Weitzman surveyed contracts that she obtained from students in an upper division sociol-
ogy course on sex roles and the law. The group included three types of couples: those already
married (22%), those planning to marry (premarrieds) (24%), and those who viewed the contract
as an alternative to marriage (cohabitors) (47%). Basic differences emerged between the married
and cohabitor groups, with the premarrieds roughly in between. Married couples were future-
oriented and collectivist. Their contracts emphasized career, education, and child-rearing goals.
They also tended to treat both property and support as joint endeavors. The cohabitors, by con-
trast, were present-oriented and individualistic. They emphasized present emotional satisfaction
rather than long term goals like children and career. They also tended to treat both property and
support as separate responsibilities. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 419-24, 426-31, 454.
3 Weitzman urges that "[tihe belief that individuals should have the freedom and privacy to
arrange their personal affairs as they wish . . . is fundamental to the philosophy of those who
advocate intimate contracts." Id. at 231. In addition to her concern for rights of individual choice,
Weitzman's rejection of the rule change strategy may also be influenced by the belief that rule
change is not a quick or dependable enough reform process.
37 Id. at 137.
" Id. Weitzman makes it clear that she weighs individual rights to freedom and privacy
above the state's interest in preserving traditional marriage, see id. at xxi, but does not, except for
approving nonenforcement of agreements "clearly harmful to children," id. at 414, state whether,
in her view, there are any other state interests that would provide valid bases for limiting private
contract rights. For discussion of other state interests that can be expected to limit private contract
rights, see infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
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that the American legal system traditionally has not, in fact, imposed
very many restrictions on the ability of individuals to order their rela-
tionships as they wish. The husband's duty of support, as Weitzman
notes, has largely been honored in the breach as long as the couple
continues to live together.3 9 Similarly, courts have not enforced the pre-
sumption that the husband was head of the household, or that the wife
is responsible for domestic services;40 if a husband wished to engage in
child care while his wife became a wage earner, no court has been
heard to complain.
Rather than restricting a couple's freedom to determine the content
of their life together, traditional state family policy has focused quite
narrowly on entrance and exit from intimate relationships.41 It has en-
couraged entrance into marital, rather than informal, relationships;4 it
has set eligibility criteria for marriage;43 and it has set conditions on
divorce.44 This focus is far from accidental. Each of these regulatory
points touch on the public interests that traditionally were believed to
require state regulation of intimate relationships: ensuring stable, ade-
quate care for minor children;45 protecting the public purse from the
claims of economically dependent wives and children;4 and reinforcing
the prevailing social consensus.
In recent years, this traditional family policy has indeed lost much
of its raison d'etre. Women have moved into the paid labor force, en-
39 See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 40-43. The Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status
of Women concluded in 1972 that "[a] married woman living with her husband can in practice get
only what he chooses to give her." CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN,
THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT AND ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT LAWS 1 (1972).
40 For example, although a wife's unjustified desertion of her husband, adultery, or other
conduct which would provide grounds for a divorce would provide a husband with a defense to a
nonsupport action against him, a wife's failure to perform domestic services, to honor her husband
as head of the household, or other misconduct short of grounds for a divorce would not. See
Annot., Defenses Available to Husband in Civil Suit by Wife for Support, 10 A.L.R. 2d 466.
4' See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953) (court has no
jurisdiction to order extremely parsimonious husband to spend more on his wife and family, if
husband and wife are living together, in absence of agreement to the contrary); accord Common-
wealth v. Glenn, 208 Pa. Super. 206, 222 A.2d 465 (1966).
42 Marriage has been encouraged through a variety of legal advantages granted only to mar-
ried couples: automatic legitimacy of offspring, marital rights of intestate succession, and the right
to maintain a wrongful death action or loss of consortium claim in the event of death or injury to
one member of the couple. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 217-18, 372.
43 Eligibility criteria include those imposed for eugenic reasons, i.e., kinship, mental and
physical health requirement; for the deterrence of immature or frivolous marriages, i.e., age and
waiting period requirements; and for the support of social consensus about marriage, i.e., bigamy
and homosexual marriage prohibitions. For a general discussion of traditional American marriage
requirements, see H. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 58-151 (2d ed.
1974).
For a description of traditional grounds for divorce, see id. at 680-707.
' See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976).
4a See, e.g., State v. Clark, 88 Wash. 2d 533, 563 P.2d 1253 (1977).
47 See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
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suring that they will not become completely dependent on state support
should a husband's support cease.48  The nuclear family centered
around a married couple has also declined in importance as a central
unit of social and economic organization.' Given these social and eco-
nomic changes, it is easy to make a good case that the state's interests in
promoting traditional marriage are largely outmoded,50 and Weitzman
is not alone in this suggestion. Recently, a number of legal scholars
have described the "withering away" of marriage as a subject of public
regulation.51 However, most of these scholars have not seen contractual
marriage regulation as the logical successor to traditional marriage law.
Instead, they have tended to assume that the withering away of mar-
riage will be followed by yet another alternative: the deregulation of
marriage.
2. Deregulating Marriage
a. The Benefits of Deregulation
Recent commentators have generally tended to assume that tradi-
tional state marriage regulation will be succeeded by nonregulation,
rather than regulation by contract.52 They have predicted that the fam-
48 By 1980, half of all married women were in the wage labor force; they contributed a
median 38% of their families' income. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 169, 172.
4" "Husband-wife couples, who made up about 75 percent of all households in 1960, com-
prised less than 65 percent of the total by the end of the 1970s and may represent only 55 percent
of the total by 1990." S. LEVITAN & R. BELOUS, supra note 19, at 127. By contrast, from 1960 to
1980 the number of female headed households almost doubled, jumping from 4,507,000 to
8,540,000, and, during the same period, the number of households comprising single individuals
jumped from 6.9 to 17.8 million. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 46-47 (1981). For a detailed account of the progressive
social and legal attenuation of family ties, see M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW
PROPERTY 11-97 (1981).
50 See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 135-38.
51 The phrase is that of Professor Mary Ann Glendon. See Glendon, The Withering Away
of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV. 663-65 (1976) (concluding that "[t]he [family law] trend is toward
leaving questions such as who can marry, who can marry whom, and how people form, conduct,
and terminate their life in common, to regulation by social rather than legal norms"). For similar
views, see, e.g., Clark, The New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J., 441, 449 (1976) ("[T]he law
appears to be in the process of redefining marriage."); Clive, Marriage: An Unnecessary Legal
Concept? in MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES (U. Eekelaar & S. Katz
eds. 1980) (concluding that marriage is not a necessary legal concept); Hoggett, Ends and Means:
The Utility of Marriage as a Legal Institution in MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN CONTEMPO-
RARY SOCIETIES 94, 101 (U. Eekelaar & S. Katz eds. 1980) ("Family law no longer makes any
attempt to buttress the stability of marriage or any other union."); Weyrauch, supra note 29, at
425 (The "striking feature of [modern] marriage in the formal legal sense is that, except as a
symbol, it is decreasingly necessary."); c. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 987 (1979)
(concluding that "the stereotypical [marital] 'family unit' that is so much a part of our constitu-
tional rhetoric is becoming decreasingly central to our constitutional reality. Such 'exercises of
familial rights and responsibilities' as remain prove to be individual powers to resist governmental
determination . . . " (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original)).
62 See, e.g., Glendon, supra note 51, at 665 ("the shift that is currently taking place in
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ily policy of the future will be almost exclusively concerned with the
parent-child relationship, as child care and support are the only tradi-
tional state family interests that still remain subjects of public con-
cern.53 With respect to marriage itself, they expect the state to engage
in little more than a licensing function, with minimal requirements for
entry and exit upon demand, presumptively without continuing spousal
support obligations. 54  These commentators 55  would not expect (or,
likely, believe it desirable) for the state to enforce agreements about
how an intimate relationship should be structured any more than they
would expect the state to enforce agreements between
moosehunters-who are also licensed by the state-on how to manage
the hunt and cook the moose.56
Deregulation also seems to offer a cure for every defect in tradi-
tional marriage law which Weitzman describes. The cure is a simple
one: if marriage were deregulated, no rights, obligations or legal pre-
sumptions would flow from marital status. Thus, in a dispute between
two cohabitants, a court would apply appropriate tort, contract, and
property principles rather than marriage law rules.57 Individuals would
American family law ... is a shift from regulation of the formation, effects, and dissolution of
marriage to non-regulation").
" See, e.g., id. at 666 ("The State's involvement with the family ... [increasingly] concen-
trates on the de facto consequences of cohabitation-economic and child-related matters-without
regard to whether formal, legal marriage has taken place."); Hoggett, supra note 51, at 100 ("in a
very short time the distinction between marriage and non-marriage will be relevant mainly to
childless unions where one partner has been economically inactive").
54 In California, it is already possible to obtain a divorce by filing a form affidavit when the
marriage has lasted no longer than five years, the value of the couple's community property does
not exceed $10,000, neither party owns real property, their unpaid obligations do not exceed
$3,000, they waive rights to spousal support, and there are no children. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4550-
4556 (West Supp. 1982). The form affidavit is reprinted in W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN,
supra note 10, SUPP. at 59 (1980).
55 Among the commentators, Professor Mary Ann Glendon has been the most forceful propo-
nent of this viewpoint. See Glendon, supra note 51, at 666 ("If the state is now in the process of
divesting itself of its marriage regulation business, then, of course, it is not likely to set up shop as
an enforcer of heretofore unenforceable contracts.").
" Disputes involving such contracts will rarely involve actions for damages since damages
are likely to be ephemeral and difficult to prove. The discretion of the equity court is therefore
crucial. Yet that court will generally refuse to exercise its power (to order specific performance or
enjoin conduct) in those disputes because "supervision of performance would involve an undue
investment of judicial time and effort." J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 16-10 (1977).
Furthermore, the expense of litigation will generally stop courts from hearing such suits.
" Under a deregulation policy, some couples might, of course, choose to enter contractual
agreements. Recognition of these contracts would not be precluded, as under traditional marriage
law. Instead, intimate contracts would be recognized and enforced to the same extent-but only
the same extent-as ordinary contracts. See supra note 56. Thus nontraditional agreements, like
those Weitzman advocates, that set out detailed terms for daily living would probably not be
recognized while agreements that simply dealt with a couple's finances and property probably
would be recognized. If these economic contracts did not violate contract doctrine or public policy,
they would also probably be enforced. For a discussion of public policy concerns that can be
expected to limit the future enforceability of marriage contracts, see infra notes 86-97 and accom-
panying text.
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order their intimate relationships as they now order personal relation-
ships outside of the family-by choice and custom, but not by law. Fur-
thermore, deregulation would not offend Weitzman's preference for
personal ordering. If the fact of marriage had no legal significance,
couples could obviously order their relationships just as they wished.
b. Why Weitzman Rejects Deregulation.
Although she does not directly consider the alternative, Weitzman
apparently rejects deregulation in favor of the contract model because of
the value of contractual agreements in promoting the stability of inti-
mate relationships. Weitzman asserts that, although the state no longer
has a valid interest in promoting traditional marriage, it continues to
have an interest in fostering stable family groups. 8 The contract model,
she claims, will further that goal. "On a commonsense level," says
Weitzman, "it would seem obvious that if people are allowed to write
their own formula for the kinds of relationships they think will make
them happy, they are more likely to create relationships that 'work' for
them and are therefore satisfying and enduring.""9
While this proposition certainly goes beyond "common sense,"
Weitzman does have some strong evidence to support her claim. Fore-
most among this evidence is the record of the Los Angeles Conciliation
Court.60 The conciliation court was originally established in 1939 to
attempt reconciliation of couples who had filed for divorce. 1 The court
has since expanded its service, and any couple may receive counseling
to resolve disagreements. The major tool used in the counseling sessions
is a detailed agreement that is negotiated by the marital partners with
the assistance of the court's counseling staff. A study of the court found
that 75% of the couples whom the court had assisted were still together
one year later.62 Forms of contract negotiation have also been employed
by marriage counselors with reported success.6
Weitzman thus makes a good case that intimate contracts can in-
53 See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 238-39 ("One of the most telling arguments in support
of contracts is that they tend to further the state's goal of supporting stability in marriage and
other family relationships.").
I d. at 239.
to For a description of the court and its operation, see id. at 235-36. More detailed descrip-
tions can be found in Elkin, Conciliation Courts: The Reintegration of Disintegrating Families, 22
FAM. COORDINATOR 63 (1973); Maddi, The Effect of Conciliation Court Proceedings on Petitions
for Dissolution of Marriage, 13 J. FAM. L. 495 (1974).
"1 Maddi, supra note 60, at 497 n.4.
42 PREFACE TO THE SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CONCILIATION COURT OF Los ANGELES
COUNTY (1970), cited in L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 236.
" For a description of the use of contracts in marriage counseling, see L. WEITZMAN, supra
note 2, at 236-37 and sources cited therein.
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deed foster stability in intimate relationships." It is also apparent that
traditional antenuptial property contracts would not provide this same
impetus to family stability; the conciliation court and marriage counsel-
ors have been successful in preserving relationships through contract
negotiation because the agreements that they encourage couples to write
deal, literally, with "practically every facet of married life."65 In the
sample contracts Weitzman provides, couples agree "not to embarrass
each other in public,"' 6 to "treat each other with esteem and affection
through ongoing companionship and sharing," ' to stay together, "ab-
sent intense pain" at least three years,"" to terminate by abortion any
pregnancy occurring before the husband completes his education, 9 and
to determine child custody, if agreement is not possible, by random
lot.7" Not only do these agreements frequently exceed the bounds cur-
rently permitted for individual agreement within marriage; 1 they inva-
riably regulate areas of private life that courts have consistently
avoided. 2
Recognition and enforcement of contracts within intimate relation-
ships-at least the type of contracts Weitzman envisions-would thus
necessitate increased state supervision of private life on a vast scale. Not
only is this a rather ironic result, given Weitzman's expressed prefer-
ence for private ordering, but it suggests that the contract model may
bring with it some disadvantages that substantially limit its viability.
II. ASSESSING THE VIABILITY OF THE CONTRACT MODEL
A. The Disadvantages of Intimate Contracts
While the intimate contracts proposed by Weitzman might have a
beneficial impact on family stability, their recognition and enforcement
would require an unprecedented degree of intrusiveness into private
life. Several factors suggest that a commitment of this sort is ill-advised.
" In addition to her data regarding the utility of marital contracts in counseling couples with
marital problems, Weitzman is also convincing in her claim that the process of negotiating a
contract will not, as some contract critics have suggested, foster negative attitudes, insecurity, or
instability. Neither a contract nor a marriage license, she quite rightly points out, can determine
how a couple feels about their relationship. Those attitudes instead will be determined by the
personal characteristics of the individuals and the social milieu in which their relationship exists.
See id. at 239-46.
6' Id. at 235 (quoting Elkin, supra note 60, at 67).
Id. at 326.
67 Id. at 325.
" Id. at 323.
69 Id. at 298.
7o Id. at 322.
' See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
72 See supra notes 12-13, 38-41 & 55 and accompanying text.
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1. The Practical Problem: Enforcement
Weitzman devotes little attention-all of two pages-to the prob-
lem of how the judicial system is to enforce contracts of the type she has
proposed.7 The problems are, of course, massive. Family courts are
already overworked and subject to lengthy case backlogs. 74 Contracts of
the sort suggested, covering every facet of married life, are also likely to
raise extremely complicated factual and legal questions. Because they
contain vague and novel provisions with which judges are not familiar,
such contracts will pose difficult questions of interpretation: what, for
example, did the parties intend when they agreed not to embarrass each
other in public?75 To avoid revealing intimate secrets? To avoid mak-
ing jokes at the other's expense? Or to avoid getting drunk and jumping
in a swimming pool? Under the contract model, judges would have to
confront-and resolve-questions like this on a daily basis. Once the
contract has been interpreted, courts would then face the equally diffi-
cult task of assessing damages .7 How much is a right not to be embar-
71 L. WErrZMAN, supra note 2, at 252-53. While Weitzman gives enforcement problems
fairly short shrift, Professor Maijorie Shultz, another recent contract advocate, admits that the
problems are, in some cases, great enough to render any effort at legal enforcement unwise.
Shultz, supra note 9, at 325. In these cases, in her view, "contractual governance could be used as
metaphor at best." Id.
For a similar view regarding the difficulties of enforcing contracts such as Weitzman pro-
poses, see Mullenix, Book Review, 15 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 759, 769-75 (1982).
74 Delays of up to a year or more for a trial date in a contested divorce are not uncommon in.
some states. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 YALE L. J. 950, 956 n. 28 (1979) (reporting delays of "at least a year from the time the parties
are ready until a trial date can be scheduled" in Connecticut and New Jersey).
7 The sample contract provision states in full that:
We agree not to embarrass each other in public by any distasteful behavior, includ-
ing sarcasm or uninvited teasing, and that excuses such as being angry or being
under the influence of alcohol do not remove responsibilities for such behavior.
L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 326. The express inclusion of "sarcasm or uninvited teasing" as
prohibited behavior makes clear that jokes at the other's expense are covered by the provision. The
word "including" also suggests that some other types of conduct are covered by the prohibition,
but does not provide guidance as to what types.
Interpretative problems are-not likely to be confined to daily living contract provisions. Sev-
eral of Weitzman's sample contracts, for example, contain provisions specifying joint ownership of
future acquired income and assets. See, e.g., id. at 302, 310, 317, 326-27. None of the provisions,
however, specifies what types of assets are to be included in the joint property. (Weitzman does
suggest that couples so specify. Id. at 267-68.) The status of pension benefits, degrees, and li-
censes-the issue that has, in recent years, most troubled courts engaged in distributing marital
assets-is thus unclear, and the existence of these contracts would not serve to avoid litigation on
this issue. As many contracts will have been drafted without legal help and years before any
judicial intervention, this type of interpretive problem is likely to be extremely common.
Finally, the countless situations that arise during the course of a long relationship make
hopeless any attempt to draft more specific provisions.
76 Weitzman's only discussion of assessment is included in a paragraph discussing the advan-
tages of a liquidated damages provision:
First, it puts parties on notice as to what they can expect if they fail to comply with
specific provisions of their contract. Second, it serves to avoid post hoc disputes
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rassed in public really worth, anyway? In addition to these problems,
intimate contracts like those which Weitzman proposes will often raise
extremely difficult issues of legality. Can a woman contract away her
constitutional right to decide whether to bear a child? Can parties agree
that they will not divorce when state law would permit them to do so?
It is not enough to suggest, as Weitzman does, that most contrac-
tual disputes will reach a court only after the relationship has broken
down.77 It is not at all apparent that this is true-indeed, the contract
model seems to invite couples to use the courts as a form of marriage
counseling. Even if it were true, the courts would still have to deter-
mine, at that point, whether and how to enforce the contract. Nor is it
easy to see how, as Weitzman urges 7 the existence of a contract could
possibly simplify divorce litigation. Those portions of the contract on
which the parties still agree would not be litigated and thus would
never come before a court; the other portions would become just an-
other issue for the court to consider in resolving the underlying
disagreements.79
Regulation of marriage by contract would thus require a consider-
able commitment of judicial resources. Given the novelty and intrusive-
ness of the regulatory effort to which those resources would be directed,
it does not seem likely that legislators or the judiciary would be willing
to make such an investment.
2. The State's Interest in Family Stability
It is not immediately apparent that the state's interest in promot-
ing family stability is sufficient to warrant a regulatory commitment on
the large scale that a new law of intimate contracts would require.
about the extent of damage (or harm) that the noncomplying partner has caused.
Third, it can assist the partners in resolving disputes informally and may help them
avoid a legal battle in court. Finally, if the parties must go to court, it documents
the parties' intentions for the judge. The last point is especially important if the
judge happens not to agree with the parties' intent because, lacking a statement, the
judge may independently assess the damages much higher (or lower) than the par-
ties intended.
L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 283. Nowhere, however, does Weitzman describe how the judge is
to make an independent damages assessment.
7 Id. at 253 ("it is likely that most contractual disputes, like most marital disputes, will
reach the courts only after the relationship has broken down. Thus it is not likely that the court
will be called upon to resolve any more cases than it now handles in divorce.").
78 Id. ("if contracts affect court calendars at all, they are likely to lighten them because most
issues that are now litigated in divorce cases will already have been resolved by contract"),
79 Weitzman also suggests that many contractors will elect to arbitrate their disputes, thus
reducing the workload of the courts. Id. at 253. While this is undoubtedly correct, the movement
toward arbitration is not dependent on acceptance of the contract model. Many couples now elect
arbitration who do not have marital contracts and it is likely that this trend will continue. See
infra note 110 and accompanying text.
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First, the state's interest in family stability may itself be minimal. Just
as the movement of women into the labor force and the decline of the
family as a social and economic institution have caused public interest
in marriage preservation to decrease, 0 these same factors have caused
the public importance of preserving all intimate relationships to de-
cline.8" The withering away of marriage thus implies the withering
away of state interest in preserving stable family groups. In the passage
following his famous maxim, Maine presciently noted this trend, urg-
ing that it is "[tjhe individual [who] is steadily substituted for the Fam-
ily as the unit of which civil laws take account."8"
In addition, to the extent that family stability remains a subject of
public concern, .it would appear that judicial involvement of the type
Weitzman's proposal contemplates does little to address that concern.
The Los Angeles Conciliation Court, which is the prime exhibit in
Weitzman's case that contracts do foster family stability, operates much
more like a marriage counseling service than a court. The contracts are
drafted with the help of marital counselors and, while an agreement is
technically enforceable through contempt citations, the court has rarely
exercised this enforcement power.8" The impact of intimate contracts on
family stability thus appears to derive primarily from the process of
resolving marital disagreements under the tutelage of a trained coun-
selor, rather than from access to a court.8 4 Judicial enforcement-or
even recognition-of these contracts is therefore unnecessary to promote
family stability; referrals by courts to marriage counseling services
would indeed appear preferable to any services which the judiciary di-
rectly could provide.
Given the practical difficulties and seeming lack of necessity for a
large-scale state commitment to family regulation like that which
"o See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. -
81 Even the parent-child relationship has not been immune from this trend. In Washington,
on a child's request, a court may order an "alternative residential placement" if it finds that a
conflict exists between parent and child that "cannot be resolved by delivery of services to the
family during continued placement in the parental home." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
13.32A.150, 13.32A.170 (Supp. 1982). See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.2(17), 232.127 (West Supp.
1982) for a similar provision. In Connecticut, a parent or a child over sixteen may secure emanci-
pation from the relationship if the court finds that "the minor willingly lives separate and apart
from his parents or guardian, with or without the consent of the parents or guardian, and that the
minor is managing his own financial affairs, regardless of the source of the lawful income" or that
emancipation is in "the best interest" of either the child or parent. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
46b-150b(3), (4) (West Supp. 1982). For a similar provision, see CALIF. CIV. CODE §§ 60-64
(West 1982).
51 H. MAINE, supra note 1, at 163. For a detailed discussion of the trend noted by Maine,
see M. GLENDON, supra note 49, at 17-97.
a See Maddi, supra note 61, at 557 n.86; see also L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 235.
This view is supported by the fact that marriage counselors report success with marital
contracts even though the contracts that are negotiated are not drafted under the auspices of a
court and are not enforceable by contempt citations. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 236-37.
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Weitzman proposes, it would seem desirable, at the very least, to limit
recognition and enforcement of personal contracts to the terms of a re-
lationship's dissolution, the point at which the legal system has tradi-
tionally intervened. Even here, however, public policy can be expected
to limit the availability of private ordering.
3. The New Family Policy and Its Impact on Private Ordering
While Weitzman is certainly correct that traditional state family
policy and its restrictions on private choice are outmoded, this does not
imply that the state no longer has any legitimate interests from which a
new family policy-with new restrictions on private choice-might be
derived. In fact, recent legal trends suggest that such a policy is in the
process of formation. 85 This emerging policy can be expected to reflect,
as did its predecessor, contemporary social and economic conditions.
The new economic independence of women and the fact that-individual
mobility and satisfaction have replaced family stability as a dominant
social ethic are thus likely to play a prominent role in defining its aims
and content.86 As a result of these new conditions and values, courts are
already less reluctant to treat unmarried couples as if they were mar-
ried,8 7  but are more reluctant-as is popular opinion-to impose
spousal support obligations other than for short-term rehabilitative or
restitutional purposes.8 Legislatures are also increasingly concerned
85 See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
86 The new ethic is apparent in the growing popular acceptance of divorce, remarriage, and
intimate relationships that bypass marriage altogether. See supra notes 20-21 for statistics. See
generally Clark, supra note 51 at 442 ("Today . . . attitudes toward marriage. . . are changing
so drastically and are publicized so widely and so rapidly that the law can hardly remain oblivious
to them.").
67 A growing number of courts are now willing to recognize explicit and implicit agreements
by unmarried couples to establish joint property. For discussion of some leading cases and general
trends, see L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 392-415. See also Flaherty, Property Rights on Termi-
nation of Alternative Life Styles: Cohabitation, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 1 (1980); Note, Enforcement of
Property Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: Morone v. Morone, 45 ALB. L. REV. 1226 (1981);
Recent Developments, Family Law-Property Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants, 58 OR. L. REV.
245 (1979). The legal status of unwed parents is also undergoing judicial redefinition, see, e.g.,
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unmarried father entitled to hearing on fitness as a
parent before state could take child from him), and two courts have now held that an unwed
cohabitant could recover for loss of spousal consortium, Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp.
1078 (D.N.J. 1980); Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange County, 9 FAM. L. REP. § 2229 (BNA)
(Cal. App. Jan. 11, 1983). See generally, Weyrauch, supra note 29, at 426 (Today "[ilf one
behaves as if he is married, he is often treated as if he were married.").
" See, e.g., Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce, supra note 4. Weitzman and her col-
leagues compared alimony awards in California in 1968 and 1977 after the change to "no-fault"
divorce laws. While the number of alimony awards did not significantly decline, id. at 1221, their
duration did. In 1968 only a third of spousal support awards had a specified duration, while by
1977 two-thirds were limited in duration. The median 1977 duration was 25 months. Id. at 1226.
The assumption behind these short-term awards seems to be that women needed support only
during a transitional period in which they reentered the job market. Id.
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with questions of child support and its enforcement, 8 as the emerging
family policy must take account of children's continuing economic
dependency.
In the same way that governmental interests limit all contract
rights, the new family policy will determine what issues are open to
contract negotiation,"0 and may substantially limit the availability of
private agreement. Contracts that call for long-term, large scale spousal
support after divorce, for example, run counter to the courts' growing
preference for short-term, rehabilitative alimony, and thus may be diffi-
Popular opinion, particularly among the young, apparently supports the trend toward short-
term alimony. In a recent reader's poll of young American women, 69% said that a husband
should be required to pay alimony only until a woman is self-supporting; an additional 14% said
that alimony should be paid "to help a woman prepare herself for a career." Only 7% thought
that alimony should be paid "all the time," while 10% thought it should "never" be paid. GLAM-
OUR, July, 1982, at 21.
"' The Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA) [Ref. File]
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 201:0071 (1982), was developed in response to increasing concern over
enforcement of child support. Since its issuance in 1968 at least 31 states have adopted some
portions of RURESA. [Ref. File] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 400:iv-v (1982). Congress has also re-
cently established a parent locator service to track down parents who are delinquent in child
support payments. See 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1976).
o0 Public policy, of course, sets limits on the enforceability of all types of contracts. In recent
years, perceived public interests, generally centered around specific types of relationships, have
come to play an increasingly larger role in determining the rights and duties of contracting parties.
For many types of contracts-landlord-tenant, insurance, consumer transactions-rights and du-
ties imposed by public policy have all but superseded those derived from the contract itself. These
trends in contract law are now sufficiently developed to have led one noted commentator to pro-
claim the "death" of traditional contract law. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT
(1974).
Weitzman's notion of contract largely overlooks these trends. According to Weitzman:
the courts have traditionally given effect to all forms of business contracts as long as
they have been freely agreed to. . . by responsible adults. . . . The judges do not
examine the content of the contract, or attempt to evaluate its wisdom. Nor do they
care whether the parties still want to adhere to the contract, or whether it will cost
them a lot of money .... [E]ven if judges themselves consider the agreement unfair
or unwise, they are nevertheless generally bound to enforce the terms of a fairly
negotiated contract.
L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 353. Weitzman apparently approves the application of this tradi-
tional contract law deference to private ordering, "hop[ing]. . . that in the vast majority of cases,
courts will give effect to contracts that are fairly.negotiated and will do true justice to the parties'
expectations." Id. at 359.
Although Weitzman essentially ignores contemporary contract law trends, Professor Marjorie
Shultz, another recent advocate of contractual marriage, recognizes that the trend does conflict
with the contract model's strong emphasis on private ordering. See Shultz, supra note 9, at 304
("even while public law intrusion into other contractual relations is increasing, marriage ought to
be moved toward the private law end of the modern continuum"). Shultz also sees public policy as
an appropriate limiting factor on private contract rights. According to Shultz, "[i]f marriage con-
tracts were legally recognized, social policies would be developed to meet the particular needs of
this subject as they have been in other areas of contract law. Thus, even while conceding greater
private governance of marriage, the law might choose to retain public policy barriers that might,
for example, render invalid contracts such as the Homosexual or Open Marriage examples." Id.
Shultz does not, however, describe what public policy limitations she believes are appropriate
restrictions of contract rights. Id. at 332.
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cult to enforce in the future."' Weitzman discusses only the obverse case
of the "weak-minded woman' in love" who is willing to accept too little
post-divorce support.92 Weitzman is not troubled by this possibility and
argues that legal protections are not necessary or appropriate.9" As her
view is here in accord with the emerging legal trend, it will probably
prevail."4 But the man who promises to support his wife for decades to
come in the style to which she would like to become accustomed is an-
other story. Weitzman's sample contracts include one of this type, in
which a first-year medical student promises his wife-to-be that, if their
marriage survives until he has finished his residency, he will pay her
one quarter of his net yearly income for as long as he continues to
practice medicine, regardless of her financial circumstances or remar-
riage.95 Weitzman's view that this type of onerous, lifetime obligation
should also be enforceable does not comport with the modern trend to-
ward encouraging self-support among divorced women and thus cannot
be expected to prevail." Similarly, the new family policy can be ex-
pected to prevent judicial recognition of private agreements that limit
the parties' right to dissolve the relationship or that predetermine child
support and custody.9"
B. A Different Role for Contract: Orderly Dissolution of Intimate
Relationships
The disadvantages of recognizing and enforcing intimate contracts
would, at first glance, suggest that the contract model of marriage regu-
lation is destined for the dustbin. But this would be a hasty judgment.
11 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
92 See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 246-48.
9S Id. at 248 ("Of course, the law cannot protect everyone from making an unwise agreement
the freedom to contract must include the freedom to make a mistake.").
" See, e.g.. Parniawski v. Parniawski, 33 Conn. Supp. 44, 359 A.2d 719 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1976) (upholding antenuputial agreement providing that neither husband nor wife could obtain
alimony or property from spouse upon dissolution of marriage); Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan.
679, 576 P.2d 629 (1978) (same); Goldfarb v. Goldfarb, 86 A.D.2d 459, 450 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1982)
(upholding separation agreement limiting husband's duty of support to $7,000 over seven years).
9" L. WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 295-99. The contract also specifies that the payment is not
alimony, which might mean that contract payments would not be tax-deductible. See 26 U.S.C. §§
71, 215 (1976).
" Weitzman's own research suggests this result. See supra note 88.
" There are apparently no reported cases involving agreements that limit the parties' right to
dissolve the relationship; with respect to agreements concerning child support, courts generally
seem ready to refuse enforcement when it appears that the child's support rights are not ade-
quately protected. See, e.g., Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 437, 358 N.E.2d 432, 436 (1976);
("An agreement to fix a spouse's support for minor children stands on a different footing [than an
agreement for spousal support]. Parents may not bargain away the rights of their children to
support from either one of them."); Brescia v. Fitts, 56 N.Y.2d 132, 436 N.E.2d 518, 451
N.Y.S.2d 68 (1982) (agreement as to child support can be modified if inadequate to meet child's
needs).
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Contractual marriage like that which Weitzman advocates may not be
the wave of the future, but private contracts are playing an increasingly
significant role in the legal regulation of intimate relationships. Con-
tracts are not being used, however, to promote family stability, but to
promote the orderly dissolution of intimate relationships.
1. Agreements Regarding the Disposition of Property
As Weitzman notes, traditional legal barriers against the recogni-
tion of agreements in contemplation of divorce, which were intended to
encourage marital stability, have now substantially eroded."8 Legal op-
position to express agreements between unmarried couples, predicated
on discouraging nonmarital relationships, is going the same route.90
What these developments promote, of course, is not the stability of rela-
tionships but their dissolution; they are a logical outgrowth of the new
family policy's emphasis on individualist values. At the same time, the
current lack of clear judicial standards regarding the definition and al-
location of marital property, 00 and the uncertainty created by Marvin
v. Marvin01 and other cases that have recognized alleged oral property
agreements, 02 have made written agreements increasingly attractive to
ensure predictability. It is thus likely that courts will become increas-
ingly willing to recognize property agreements within intimate relation-
ships, and that the number of such agreements will also increase.1 0 3
2. Divorce: The New Arena for Contract
Divorce agreements are likely to play an even more important part
in the family law of the future. Just as family policy has shifted,'" so
8 See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 257 So. 2d
530 (Fla. 1972); Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973). For a general discussion
of the cases and legal trends, see L. WE1TZMAN, supra note 2, at 347-52; and Clark, supra note 9.
" See, e.g., Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Morone v. Morone, 50
N.Y.2d 48, 407 N.E.2d 438, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1980). For general discussion of the cases and
trend, see L. WETZMAN supra note 2, at 392-415. A compendium of cases and recent legislation is
available in Freed & Foster, supra note 29 at 4099-101.
10 The status of pension benefits, degrees, and licenses have all been heavily litigated in
recent years with widely varying results. See, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 452
N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982) (license to practice medicine is subject to New York equitable distribution
law); Lesman v. Lesman, 110 Misc. 2d 815, 442 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1981) (license to practice
medicine not subject to New York equitable distribution law). A compendium of cases and statutes
up to September 1982 is available in Freed & Foster, supra note 29, at 4069-74 (degrees and
licenses); and id. at 4094-99 (retirement and pension benefits).
'0o 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) (oral implied-in-fact agreement
to pool and share earnings between unmarried cohabitants is enforceable).
102 See supra note 99 and sources cited therein.
101 The new family policy's emphasis on individualist values will also set limits on the en-
forceability of contracts between cohabitants. See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
104 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
1060 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:1039
have the procedures by which marital and divorce conflicts are resolved.
Under the traditional marriage contract, obtaining a divorce required
establishing, to a court's satisfaction, that legal grounds for a divorce
were present.10 5 Thus, even uncontested divorces were litigated. Under
the newly emerging family policy, this scenario has changed. A couple
seeking a divorce may obtain one essentially upon demand.'0 Litiga-
tion is largely unnecessary and, when it does occur, it is focused almost
exclusively on the aftermath of divorce-custody, child support, ali-
mony, and property disposition-rather than on the basis for the di-
vorce itself. Increasingly, separating couples avoid the courts altogether;
they divorce by filing a separation agreement.10 7
Additionally, both popular and legal opinion increasingly view di-
vorce as a process which should aim at negotiated accommodation,
rather than a litigated contest.'0 8 Toward this end, a hybrid discipline
joining law and marriage counseling has emerged to offer counseling
and negotiation services to separating couples." 9 The popularity of
these new agencies is growing, and they can be expected to handle an
increasing proportion of separation disputes." 0 The outcome of their
services is, like the intimate contracts which Weitzman proposes, a con-
tract governing every aspect of the relationship-with the focus, of
course, on dissolving, rather than continuing it.
Because of the links between the new separation services and the
10 For a discussion of the traditional grounds for obtaining a divorce and defenses, see H.
CLARK, supra note 43, at 680-707.
'0' As of April 1982, only Illinois and South Dakota limited divorce to traditional "fault"
grounds. Freed & Foster, supra note 29, at 4074. "In practice this has come to mean that either
spouse can obtain a divorce at will." Clark, supra note 51, at 444.
107 Mnookin & Kornhauser estimate that less than 10% of divorces now involve disputes that
are contested in court. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 74, at 951 n.3.
108 For examples of the literature, see 0. COOPER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE
SETTLEMENT (1981); J. HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION (1981); Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra
note 74; Spencer & Zammit, Mediation-Arbitration: A Proposal for Private Resolution of Dis-
putes Between Divorced or Separated Parents, 1976 DUKE L.J. 911 (1976); Winks, Divorce Me-
diation: A Nonadversary Procedure for the No Fault Divorce, 19 J. FAM. L. 615 (1980-81); Note,
Non-Judicial Resolution of Custody and Visitation Disputes, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 582 (1979).
'" In a recent review of family law developments, Freed & Foster note "the proliferation
throughout the country of private mediation centers offering services by trained mediators who
may be either social scientists or attorneys." Freed & Foster, supra note 29, at 4067. The prolifer-
ation is evident in the enormous increase in the number of mediation services within the last
couple of years. A 1982 directory of mediation services, DIVORCE MEDIATION RESEARCH PROJECT
(1982), ASSOCIATION OF FAMILY CONCILIATION COURTS, 1982 DIRECTORY OF MEDIATION SER-
VICES, lists approximately 400 public and private divorce mediation services, as compared to ap-
proximately 140 such services listed in a 1981 directory, SPECIAL COMM. ON RESOLUTION OF
MINOR DISPUTES, PUBLIC SERVICES AGTIVITIES DIVISION, DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM 1981
DIRECTORY (1980).
"0 California, traditionally a legal trend-setter, now statutorily requires mediation in all
cases of contested child custody and visitation. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West. Supp. 1982). Bills
to establish public sector mediation services are also currently pending before a number of state
legislatures. Freed & Foster, supra note 29, at 4068.
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marriage counseling establishment, it is quite possible that a continuum
will develop between marriage counseling and divorce counseling, with
contracts-perhaps including those as detailed as the ones Weitzman
advocates-made before and during the marriage providing a founda-
tion for negotiation about separation agreements.111 Thus, while
noneconomic contracts within existing intimate relationships are un-
likely to be recognized or enforced by the courts, such agreements may
ultimately play a role in shaping the separation agreements by which
American couples increasingly terminate -their relationships. 12
In short, although family law is not speeding toward contractual
marriage, it is certainly moving in the direction of contractual separa-
tion. Marriage by contract does not seem a likely prospect, but divorce
by contract is already with us and is, apparently, here to stay.
III. CONCLUSION
Although The Marriage Contract presents what is probably the
best possible case for the legal recognition and enforcement of intimate
contracts, that case is ultimately not a persuasive one. The deficiencies
in traditional marriage law cannot be resolved by contract alone. Rec-
ognition and judicial enforcement of contracts like those Weitzman pro-
poses are both impractical and unnecessary. Public policy with regard
to the family can also be expected to substantially limit private contract
rights.
That is not to say, however, that contracts have no legitimate role
to play in the legal regulation of marriage. Private agreements are in-
creasingly significant as a means of insuring the orderly dissolution of
intimate relationships. But this use of contracts in regulating intimate
relationships is far more limited than that which Weitzman has urged,
and serves quite different purposes.
In the end, Weitzman's argument on behalf of contract fails for a
simple reason: it ignores the fact that the legal regulation of mar-
riage-like all types of government regulation-pertains largely to
those aspects of the subject that are perceived to have public signifi-
111 Intimate contracts will not have a significant impact on the negotiation process, of course,
where their terms conflict with the likely result of litigating the case.
11 In a revealing passage, Weitzman suggests that "opponents of intimate contracts regard
marriage primarily as a public institution, while proponents view it as a private relationship." L.
WEITZMAN, supra note 2, at 231 (citing Rausmussen, Interspousal Contracts: The Potential for
Validation in Massachusetts, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 185 (1974)). But, of course, marriage is both
a public as well as a private institution. More importantly, the law generally does not bother to
regulate marriage in its purely private aspects. The location of the honeymoon, the housekeeping
ability of the spouses, the names of the children, and other aspects of the relationship that are not
thought to implicate state interests are simply left to the discretion of the marital partners without
any intervention by the legal system.
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cance. 1 3 Accordingly, private contracts cannot be expected to take pre-
cedence over other forms of marriage regulation unless they are consis-
tent with the contemporary social and economic context in which
regulation occurs and the public interests that are implicated within
that context.
The traditional marriage contract did not simply spring forth from
the courts by parthenogenesis; it mirrored an evolving social consensus
and a pattern of economic organization. The marriage law of the future
will continue to mirror this social evolution, and it cannot be expected
to focus on family stability, as Weitzman suggests it should, when so-
cial and economic institutions demand individual freedom, mobility,
and the attainment of personal satisfaction. Family law, like the family,
remains tied to the social and economic setting from which it emerges.
113 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
